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Abstract 
Over the last more than two decades, political parties and governments across sub-Saharan Africa 
have adopted electoral gender quotas for parliament at an astonishing rate – and with remarkable 
success as many sub-Saharan African countries have catapulted to the top in terms of women’s 
representation in a single or lower house of parliament. During a first wave in East and Southern 
Africa, quotas were adopted in the aftermath of conflicts and in the course of political transitions as 
mobilized national women’s movements, influenced by an international women’s movement and 
international norms, took advantage of political openings to press for the adoption of quotas through 
new constitutions or new electoral laws. In some cases a clear diffusion effect was at play between 
political movements that closely influenced one another. During a second wave mostly, though not 
only, in West Africa, quotas are again being adopted as women’s movements, in collaboration with 
regional, continental and international organizations, similarly press for an increased representation of 
women during constitutional reform processes or through revisions to electoral laws. During this 
second wave, creative quota designs have emerged as parties and governments have sought to 
strengthen existing electoral gender quotas or adopt them for the first time. This paper examines some 
innovations in quota design and quota use in three sub-Saharan African cases that are part of the 
second wave, including the move to gender parity and the possibility of an only ‘temporary’ special 
measure.  
Keywords 
Women in African parliaments, electoral gender quotas, second wave of gender quotas, gender parity, 
quota innovations, quota design 
 
 1 
Introduction 
Across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) the use of electoral gender quotas has dramatically transformed 
national legislatures in just under three decades, such that the tiny East African country of Rwanda 
leads the world in women’s representation in a single or lower house of parliament, with 64 percent 
women in its Chamber of Deputies following the 2013 election
1
 - and a dozen other SSA countries top 
the world list. The first wave
2
 of countries to adopt some kind of electoral gender quota in the 1990s 
and early 2000s were post-transition or more likely post-conflict countries in East and Southern Africa 
such as Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi. In these 
countries a similar set of factors was largely at play including: the political opportunity structure 
offered by a political transition (often post-conflict
3
), entailing the adoption of new constitutions and 
electoral laws, mobilized national women’s movements with support from an international women’s 
movement, cadres of capable women many of whom had participated in conflicts or benefited from 
overseas training during exile, diffusion effects from one country/movement to another, and a 
liberation movement/dominant party with a stated commitment to women’s emancipation (Bauer and 
Britton, 2006). More recently, a second wave of SSA countries is following suit. Zimbabwe, Lesotho, 
Kenya, Somalia and the Sudans have recently adopted electoral gender quotas and, for the first time, a 
raft of Francophone/West African countries such as Senegal, Cameroon, Cape Verde and Benin have 
adopted or are considering the adoption of some kind of electoral gender quota.
4
 In these countries too 
mobilized national women’s movements have called for the adoption of new electoral laws and gender 
quotas, often working in collaboration with regional, continental or international organizations and 
usually as part of a constitutional review process. Those countries that have not yet adopted 
meaningful gender quotas (beyond voluntary party quotas that may or may not actually be 
implemented) are mostly Anglophone countries with plurality majority electoral systems such as 
Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Zambia, Botswana, and Nigeria, among others.
5
 
A few features of the use of electoral gender quotas in sub-Saharan Africa stand out. First, across 
the continent a range of creative and innovative designs has been used in adopting and implementing 
electoral gender quotas. Second, electoral gender quotas in sub-Saharan Africa often, though not 
always, ‘work’ in ways that they do not in other places. Moreover, by and large there has been no 
turning back; so that in those countries in which meaningful quotas have been used in successive 
election cycles the percentage of women has risen steadily. Finally, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that women have been politically empowered by the use of electoral gender quotas across SSA 
(Bauer 2008, 2012).  
Over the last two decades, several conventions and protocols have addressed the need for women’s 
greater participation in politics and decision making, some specific to sub-Saharan Africa and others 
not, with many making recommendations for specific percentages of women in elected office by a 
certain year. Across the continent, national, regional and international women’s organizations 
                                                     
1
 Rwanda has led the world in women’s representation in a single or lower house of parliament since 2003. 
2
 In a recent conference paper Dahlerup and Norris (2014) refer to three waves of global quota adoption: the first being in 
former communist countries and a few others such as Pakistan in the 1950s and Bangladesh in the 1970s, the second 
being the more recent wave beginning with Argentina and its 30 percent legislative quota in 1990, and a third wave in 
which many second wave quotas are amended and strengthened. This paper refers to those second and third waves as 
Africa’s first and second waves, with the second wave in Africa entailing a new round of quota adoptions, usually a 
legislated quota of one kind or another, or the strengthening of an existing quota.  
3
 Hughes and Tripp (forthcoming) show just how significant conflict and the end of conflict have been to the adoption of 
electoral gender quotas and other political gains for women in Africa, 1985-2010. 
4
 UN Women, 2011; 28 March 2013; 4 September 2013; 25 October 2013.  
5
 See Bauer, 2010; Ibrahim, 2004. 
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routinely refer to these documents as they seek to influence governments and, in particular, as they 
seek to put in place specific measures such as electoral gender quotas to meet their goals. These 
conventions and protocols include: the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (Articles 3, 7 & 8); the 1995 Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (Critical Area of Concern G and Articles 181-195); the 1997 Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Declaration on Gender and Development, which set a minimum 
target of 30 percent representation by women in leadership positions by 2005; the 2000 Millennium 
Declaration and Development Goals (Goal 3, Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, sets a 
target of 50 percent of seats in parliaments held by women by 2015); the 2003 Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), 
which set a target of 50 percent representation by women in decision-making bodies by 2020; the 2004 
Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa in which leaders pledged a commitment to gender 
parity in the African Union and their own governments; and the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and 
Development which set a target of 50 percent representation in decision-making positions by women 
for all SADC countries by 2015. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 
also developed a 2010-2020 Gender Strategy. 
Many arguments are advanced for increasing women’s representation in national legislatures, for 
example that it is unfair or unjust for men to monopolize political power, that without increasing 
women’s representation women’s interests, needs and concerns will not be adequately addressed, and 
that legislative bodies that are more inclusive and more representative are also more democratic 
(Phillips, 1998). There is also a ‘role model’ argument, in that there is a powerful impact on future 
elections of bringing the first women into elected political office.
6
 These ideas resonate across the 
African continent, in particular the suggestion that women’s representation should be increased in 
order to ensure attention to women’s interests.7 In addition, gender quotas are seen as necessary in 
order to level the playing field for women candidates. In many African countries women encounter a 
long list of obstacles in standing for political office including lack of financial resources, less access to 
education and the same work opportunities as men, negative stereotypes and social attitudes, the 
burden of domestic responsibilities, violence and lack of access to information (WIPSU, 2011).
8
 An 
ECOWAS concept paper argues that experience shows, that “unless African countries undertake 
electoral reform and deliver positive measures, such as electoral quotas, using regional and 
international instruments on gender equality, advocacy and networking,” they will not succeed in 
increasing women’s representation (UN Women, 2011: 18). The enthusiasm of women activists and 
women politicians across the continent for the adoption of electoral gender quotas is understandable. 
This paper discusses three cases of ‘second wave’ SSA countries in which innovative designs are 
being adopted – for gender parity in Senegal and Tanzania and for a temporary special measure in 
Zimbabwe.  
                                                     
6
 Fatou Kine Diop, leader of two Senegalese women’s organizations (discussed below): “…when a woman sits down to 
watch TV and sees that at the National Assembly, there are a lot of head wraps, she is going to say to herself that women 
can be people of power” (Bissonnettee, 2013). 
7
 Here it is important to acknowledge that the concept of ‘women’s interests’ is a contested one and that they, like women, 
are not monolithic; see Tamale (1999:74–75).That said, in an African context in which so many (though not all) socio-
economic indicators for women are inferior to those of men, and critical issues such as gender-based violence, family law 
and women’s access to land are to be decided, it is suggested that women legislators may well be motivated to represent 
the interests, needs and concerns of other women.dd footnote on women’s interests. 
8
 Ibrahim (2004) adds several more for Ghana and Nigeria: political party actions to subvert women candidates, use of the 
‘indigeneity ploy,’ the suffocating role of an all-powerful national women’s association or first lady’s foundation. 
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Types of Electoral Gender Quotas Used in SSA 
In sub-Saharan Africa today the three typical types of electoral gender quotas (as identified by the 
QuotaProject global database) are used, namely, legislated candidate quotas, voluntary political party 
quotas and reserved seats. Thirty-four of 49 SSA countries claim to have some kind of electoral 
gender quota while 15 of 49 have none (see Table 1). Of the 15 countries that have no electoral gender 
quota, 12 are countries that use a plurality majority or first past the post (FPTP) electoral system of 
one kind or another – considered less ‘woman friendly’ than a proportional representation (PR) 
electoral system and a more difficult system for using an electoral gender quota (Laserud and Taphorn, 
2007: 15). In general, some types of quotas are more commonly used with some types of electoral 
systems, for example, voluntary party quotas with proportional representation electoral systems, or 
reserved seats with plurality majority or first past the post electoral systems, and this is true for sub-
Saharan Africa as well.
9
 Indeed, as Laserud and Taphorn (2007: 27) observe, legislated candidate 
quotas are particularly effective with PR systems while reserved seats are the only ‘best-fit 
combination’ with a FPTP electoral system. Reserved seats are more commonly used in sub-Saharan 
Africa than in any other part of the world.
10
 Among the second wave of countries to adopt electoral 
gender quotas in SSA, the main type of quota to be adopted is a legislated candidate quota or 
(legislated) reserved seat. 
Twenty-three SSA countries use voluntary political party or legislated candidate quotas and 11 use 
reserved seats. Voluntary political party or legislated candidate quotas are candidate quotas and for 
neither quota is the outcome guaranteed, in contrast to reserved seats in which the number of seats 
held by women will be the number of seats reserved for them.
11
 As a rule, candidate quotas used with 
PR electoral systems – adding women’s names to party lists - can be very effective, especially if 
placement mandates and sanctions for non-compliance are used as well. In SSA, 15 of the 23 countries 
that use voluntary party or legislated candidate quotas do so with a PR (or mixed) system, namely, 
Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa and Togo. Countries like Mozambique, Namibia, 
and South Africa were among the first in which the leading or dominant political parties – with 
overwhelming majorities in parliaments - voluntarily adopted significant party quotas (of around 25 or 
30 percent in the early 1990s with the percentage increasing over time) and created ‘zebra lists’ in 
which women’s names were alternated regularly with men’s names on party lists. In 2009 the ruling 
African National Congress in South Africa adopted a “quota of not less than fifty percent of women in 
all elected structures” (the country has a legislated candidate quota for local level elections) 
(www.quotaproject.org) and since the 2014 election 41 percent of seats in the National Assembly are 
held by women. In cases such as these, other political parties have often followed suit (a ‘contagion’ 
effect), incorporating large numbers of women into their own party lists. 
Cameroon is a country in which some political parties early on adopted a voluntary party quota, but 
it was not until the 2013 election – following the adoption of a new Electoral Code in 2012 and with 
substantial mobilization and pressure on political parties by women’s organizations in collaboration 
with continental organizations like the African Union or international organizations like UN Women - 
that an outcome of more than 30 percent women in parliament was achieved (Touo 2013; UN Women, 
25 October 2013). In other SSA countries too, like Angola and Senegal, an electoral law requires that 
some percentage of women be included on party lists. So, for example, in Angola, since 2005 the 
charters of political parties must include “rules which encourage the promotion of equal opportunities 
and equity between men and women, as well as a gender representation of not less than 30 percent in 
                                                     
9
 As Laserud and Taphorn (2007: 19) note: the electoral system and the quota to be used must be considered together 
instead of separately. 
10
 Matland (2006: 280) asserts that reserved seats are more commonly utilized in less democratic political systems. 
11
 Laserud and Taphorn (2007: 8) distinguish between quotas that are applied during the nomination process of candidates 
and those that are ‘results-based.’ 
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their governing bodies at all levels” (www.quotaproject.org) and since the 2012 election 37 percent of 
women in Angola’s parliament are women. Senegal is the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to adopt 
a parity law for national legislative elections. The amended electoral law of 2012 mandates parity in 
all candidate lists for the general elections. Candidate lists must be composed of alternating male and 
female candidates. So long as a placement mandate is respected or required, this type of quota used 
with a proportional representation electoral system is highly effective and ‘seamless.’  
About eight of 34 sub-Saharan African countries have voluntary party or legislated candidate 
quotas alongside a FPTP electoral system, making the quotas potentially 'meaningless.' In the case of 
voluntary political party quotas used in a FPTP system, it may be the case, as in Botswana or the Ivory 
Coast that parties do not even abide by a stated quota during the party primary process (Bauer, 2010; 
www.quotaproject.org). Even with a legislated candidate quota in a FPTP electoral system, while a 
certain percentage of women candidates may be legislated (for example, 15 percent in the Congo since 
a 2007 electoral law was passed) there is no guarantee that 15 percent of those elected will be women.  
Finally, 11 of 34 sub-Saharan African countries have reserved seats or special seats that are used 
almost exclusively with plurality majority or first past the post electoral systems (although may be 
used alongside a PR system). In SSA reserved seats are typically used by adding a certain number of 
women-only seats – based on women-only contests, usually a specified number per district or county 
or province. So, for example, in Uganda out of 375 seats in parliament, 112 are reserved for women-
only contests, one in each district. A further 25 seats are reserved as follows: 10 representatives of the 
Uganda People’s Defence Forces, of whom 2 must be women; 5 youth representatives, of whom 1 
must be a woman; 5 representatives of persons with disabilities, of whom one must be a woman; and 5 
representatives of workers, of whom one must be a woman. Of course women are also free to stand in 
the directly elected constituency seats. In Rwanda out of 80 deputies in the chamber of deputies, 53 
are elected from party lists in a closed list proportional representation election and 24 women are 
elected from ‘reserved seats’ – two elected from each province and from the city of Kigali by an 
electoral college with a women-only ballots (in addition two members are elected by the National 
Youth Council and one member by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled). In Rwanda a 
double quota exists in that women are also supposed to comprise 30 percent of party lists with women 
apparently doing even better than that in order to achieve the end result of 64 percent women in 
Rwanda’s Chamber of Deputies. Tanzania represents another method of electing women into reserved 
seats. Out of 357 total members of the Bunge, 102 women are elected by political parties in proportion 
to their share of the electoral vote in the general election and five members are elected from Zanzibar 
of whom two must be women; further the president appoints 10 members of whom five must be 
women. As in the other countries women are also free to stand in directly elected constituency seats. 
In a FPTP system then, reserved seats typically entail additional women-only seats added to 
previously existing ‘constituency’ seats. Of course women are allowed to stand and do stand in the 
constituency seats as well and in such cases will contribute to exceeding a gender quota. Zimbabwe, in 
its National Assembly, combines the two methods of electing women to reserved seats. For the 60 
reserved seats in the National Assembly six women are elected from each of 10 administrative 
provinces; the seats are allocated to political parties based on the overall share of votes received in the 
constituency based seats in that province by the party (www.ipu.org; www.quotaproject.org). All in 
all, then, about 26 of 49 or more than half of all SSA countries may be considered to use ‘effective’ 
electoral gender quotas for parliaments. 
Innovations in Quota Design and Use in SSA 
Among the innovations in electoral gender quota design and use in sub-Saharan Africa is the move 
toward gender parity in parliament in some countries, rather than simply a gender quota that stipulates 
that 20 to 30 percent of parliamentary seats be held by women (or even a gender neutral quota). 
Another innovation in the design and use of quotas is for the quotas to be truly temporary special 
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measures in that a time limit is defined for the quota from the outset. Parity is discussed here as 
adopted or proposed for Senegal and Tanzania and a temporary quota as adopted in Zimbabwe.  
Gender Parity – Senegal 
In the early post-independence years under single-party rule (1963-1975), only a small number of 
women were nominated and held elective office in Senegal; according to Beck (2003: 147) those few 
who did were usually the wives and relatives of “well-placed male politicians.” This started to change 
with the introduction of democratic reforms from the mid-1970s onwards. In addition to the usual 
challenges - like exclusion from leadership positions in political parties and a lack of resources - 
women in Senegal were hampered by “gendered patronage networks” that constituted a “hidden 
public” not addressed by political reforms beginning in the mid-1970s, according to Beck (148). By 
the mid-2000s, Creevey (2006: 169) contended that election to the National Assembly in Senegal was 
not ‘the highest priority’ for Senegalese women, all the more so because the National Assembly was 
little ‘more than an audience for the decrees of government.’12 At the time Creevey (151) identified 
three factors contributing to women’s ‘slow infiltration into national electoral politics’: on the one 
hand, the potentially limiting influence of culture and religion (Islam) on women’s political 
participation and, on the other hand, the likely benefits of a mixed electoral system and some 
voluntary party quotas for some party lists and a growing number of women’s organizations with more 
qualified and trained women members. Over the years, the percentage of women in Senegal’s National 
Assembly had grown slowly but surely – from 7 percent in 1978 to 12 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 
2007.
13
 By the time of the 2012 election, Senegal was the first country in Africa to successfully 
implement a parity system for elections for parliament, bringing in a chamber that was 43 percent 
women.
14
 What accounts for the transformation? What does a parity system for parliamentary 
elections in Senegal look like? 
Senegal’s parity law, known as the Gender Parity Law, was adopted on 28 May 2010; it aims to 
secure full equality in all elective and semi-elective bodies – at local, regional and national levels (UN 
Women, 12 July 2012). In brief, the law “clearly obliges political parties to submit candidate lists that 
present men and women in an alternate manner,” with the male-female ratio to be as close to 50 
percent as possible (UN Women, 2011: 19). Many of the familiar factors behind women’s increased 
legislative representation across the continent came together in the Senegalese case: a political 
opportunity structure, significant mobilization by women’s organizations enlisting the support of 
international organizations (and a range of relevant protocols) and ‘political will.’ Fatou Kine Diop, 
president of both the Observatoire national de la parité (ONP, National Observatory on Gender 
Parity) and the Conseil sénégalais des femmes (COSEF, Senegalese Council of Women), suggests that 
two “converging factors” contributed to the emergence of the Gender Parity Law: “women’s political 
activism and political will.” She notes that African women have been “fighting for decades” for 
greater political representation. Indeed, Sow (2013) states that women in Senegal had requested a 25 
percent gender quota in 1977, but ‘never gained it.’  
                                                     
12
 Faye (2012) observes still in 2012 that the lower house of parliament in Senegal ‘is often considered to be a rubber stamp 
for the president’s decisions.’  
13
 No results available disaggregated by gender for the 1968 and 1973 elections. Otherwise, the percentage of women 
elected was as follows: 1978 7 percent, 1983 11 percent, 1988 12.5 percent, 1993 12 percent, 1998 12 percent, 2001 19 
percent, 2007 18 percent. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2277.htm 
14
 In 2011 Tunisia adopted a gender parity law gender parity law, requiring equal numbers of women and men as candidates 
in national legislative elections (AWID, 2011). In October 2011 the first parity election – for a national constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution – used a closed party-list proportional representation system for all 217 seats with 
parties required to ensure that at least half of their lists were filled by women, alternating men and women candidates 
throughout the lists. In the event, with men listed first and in odd positions, and many political parties, only 28 percent of 
those elected were women. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2392.htm 
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According to Kasse (2004: 66), from the early 1990s one could observe a “growing consciousness 
of women themselves, encouraged by a national and international situation favourable to women’s 
representation in terms of quality and numbers.” Coordinated action to promote women into formal 
political office really began, according to Kasse, “in the context of international preparations for the 
Beijing conference. Until then, initiatives were isolated and weak.” In 1994 COSEF was formed by a 
group of women involved with political parties, trade unions and women’s organizations “to create a 
unified structure to promote women’s leadership, especially in politics” (Kasse, 2004: 67). Sow (2013) 
also notes that the UN conferences on women, in particular the 1995 Beijing conference, were an ‘eye-
opener’ for Senegalese women as they were confronted with and wrestled with ideas and discourses 
from around Africa, the global South and the West. In 1998 COSEF raised the issue of quotas for 
women’s representation with political parties. In 2000, according to Diop, the political climate became 
more “favourable,” in that with the election of President Aboulaye Wade a new political party came to 
power for the first time since independence (Bissonnette, 2013); in 2001 a new constitution was 
adopted that acknowledged certain rights of women, though did not include an electoral gender quota 
for increasing women’s representation in politics (Kasse, 2004: 68). Still, it may be argued that these 
changes presented women’s organizations and their regional and international allies with the ‘political 
opportunity structure’ (Waylen, 2007), to press forward with a demand for gender parity in elections.  
Within just a few years, in 2004, Senegal ratified the ‘Maputo Protocol,’ which commits 
signatories to gender parity (the legislative and executive bodies of the African Union abide by a strict 
gender parity) – and added it to its constitution. According to Diop: “From that moment on, we knew 
that we had good legal and political arguments to revive the debate on parity in government.” In 2005, 
COSEF launched the “Together, let’s strengthen democracy with gender parity!” campaign. A Parity 
March in early 2007 brought women of all walks together to ‘forge partnerships’ and to present to the 
president of Senegal the proposal to entrench gender parity into the Electoral Code (Bissonnette, 
2013).
15
 Five years of significant mobilization later, the Gender Parity Law was “approved by a large 
majority in Senegal’s National Assembly” and welcomed by a diverse spectrum of women (Diallo, 
2010). To ensure further success, such as that of the initial gender parity election in 2012, the ONP 
was established in order to monitor the implementation of the Gender Parity Law, but also to continue 
to promote gender parity in public policy (Bissonnette, 2013). Indeed, women activists recognize that 
the struggle is far from over. Haoua Dia Thiam, a Senegalese member of parliament (MP) who was 
active in getting the parity law passed in 2010, acknowledged that parity in the National Assembly 
alone would not overcome cultural barriers to women’s equality in Senegal. Sophie Ly Sow, of the 
Open Society Initiative for West Africa, reported that in the rural areas of Senegal parity had become a 
Wolof word with a negative meaning, translating as “I no longer accept my husband’s authority” 
(Hirsch, 2012). Safietou Diop, president of the civil society organization Reseau Siggil Jigeen argues 
that an important future step is for women MPs to ensure gender equality in legislative committees, 
where much of the work of the legislature takes place (Palus, 2012). For the next parliamentary 
election in Senegal, women activists are already calling for another innovation – that women’s names 
be placed in odd rather than even positions on party lists, including of course the first position. 
Gender Parity - Tanzania 
Since 1985 Tanzania has used ‘special’ or reserved seats for women to increase their presence in the 
single house of parliament, the Bunge, first by designating a certain number of seats for women (15) 
and then by designating a certain percentage of seats for women – up to 30 percent, or 75 seats, by the 
time of the 2005 election. Since the adoption of reserved seats in the mid-1980s, women’s presence in 
                                                     
15
 According to Diop, during the march, women dressed all in white – “the only colour we felt would transcend all the 
others, which were already associated with political parties” (Bissonnette, 2013). In Liberia, women activists also dressed 
in white during marches to end the civil conflict in that country. 
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the Bunge has grown steadily, reaching 36 percent at the last election in 2010.
16
 Women are selected 
into the special seats by political parties based on the percentage of the vote earned by each party. 
Over the years, adjustments have been made to the rules governing the special seats, for example, how 
or how many women are selected into them. More recently, as Tanzania engages in the process of 
drafting and adopting a new constitution, pressure has emerged to embrace gender parity for 
parliamentary elections – by simply electing one man and one woman from each constituency. From 
where does this impetus originate and how will gender parity be achieved in a plurality majority 
electoral system?  
Unlike in many other countries, according to Anne Makinda (2011: 29), an MP in the Bunge, the 
political will to increase women’s representation in parliament has existed for a long time in Tanzania. 
She suggests that from before independence, when strong and influential women supported Julius 
Nyerere and his fight for independence, Nyerere ‘consistently advocated for greater women’s 
representation within the government and his political party.’ Women activists such as Bibi Titi 
Mohammed brought more women than men into the nationalist movement and first the Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) and then the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) sought a socialist 
transformation of Tanzania to which gender inequality was considered to be an impediment (Yoon, 
2008: 65). Women’s active involvement in the independence struggle and the early post-independence 
commitment to socialism translated into at least a rhetorical commitment to gender equality and a role 
for women in formal politics. Thus ‘special’ seats were created already at independence to ensure 
representation of a range of groups, including women. But the number of women in constituency-
based seats remained miniscule in the 1960s and 1970s and without a system that guaranteed a certain 
number or percentage of women members, a greater gender balance would remain elusive (Makinda, 
2011: 29). The social and economic disadvantages facing women as potential candidates were such 
that without adopting some kind of electoral gender quota, women’s representation could not be 
guaranteed (Yoon, 2008: 66). 
Thus, in 1985 Tanzania moved to a more formal special seat system whereby 15 seats were 
reserved for women and 15 seats for members of mass organizations affiliated to the CCM (at that 
time Tanzania was still officially a one party state). After the transition to a multiparty political system 
in 1992 and for the 1995 election the seats reserved for women were increased to 15 percent of the 
total of all elected members plus five members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives and the 
Union Attorney General, and the special seats for mass organizations were eliminated. For the 2000 
election the percentage was raised to 20 percent and for the 2005 election to 30 percent (Yoon, 2008: 
66-67). The mechanism by which women have been elected into special seats has also changed over 
time. Since 1995 special seats have been distributed proportionally based on the number of votes 
garnered by each political party rather than based on the number of seats won by each party (Makinda, 
2011: 30) – an important distinction in a first past the post electoral system. According to Yoon (2008: 
67) the increase in the quota for women’s special seats may be attributed to lobbying on the part of the 
Union of Tanzania Women (UWT), women politicians, non-governmental organizations advocating 
for gender equality and the government – in order to bring women’s participation in politics in line 
with international conventions signed and ratified by the government, in particular the 1997 SADC 
Declaration on Gender and Development which called for women to be in 30 percent of political 
decision making positions by 2005. 
Around 2010 the CCM, only, proposed an internal party rule, that CCM women MPs in special 
seats be allowed only two terms in a special seat before they would have to stand for a constituency 
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 This move was in keeping with the idea of special seats as temporary measures and as ‘stepping 
stones’ to constituency-based seats (Makinda, 2011; Yoon, 2011). A further and more significant 
innovation emerged around the same time, namely, that Tanzania should move toward gender parity in 
its national legislature, in keeping with the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development that 
demands women’s 50 percent participation in political decision making by 2015. The key mechanism 
for improving women’s representation in Tanzania has been the constitution (Abdallah, 2012). 
Increases in the percentage of special seats for women in 1995, 2000, and 2005 for women were 
achieved through constitutional amendments. The most recent innovation to the representation of 
women in the country is also part and parcel of an effort to draft a new constitution for the country. A 
Constitutional Review Commission was appointed in early 2012 and a Constituent Assembly is busy 
reviewing provisions of a draft constitution, with their efforts to be concluded by August 2014. 
DemoFinland (2013) argues that despite the increasing percentage of women in Tanzania’s Bunge, 
women have not been ensured a genuine participation: women MPs have still been “working under a 
‘men’s mandate’,” working more to strengthen their respective parties than to promote equality and 
democracy. The new constitution, by contrast, offers a significant change: “the special seats for 
women would be abolished and from every electoral district, a man and a woman would be elected. 
Should this reform be included in the final version of the new constitution, half of the Tanzanian 
parliamentarians will be women in the future. And most of all, they will be democratically elected 
women accountable to their voters and their own electoral district.” 
Individual women MPs have been at the forefront of the campaign for a 50/50 representation in the 
Bunge. Anna Abdallah, MP and chair of the Tanzanian Women Parliamentary Group (TWPG), has 
been lobbying for the change since the beginning of the constitutional review process with the TWPG 
lobbying its own member political parties (Abdallah, 2012; DemoFinland, 2013). Women activists cite 
the examples of the African Union and the Millennium Development Goals as they seek to have a 
50/50 representation of women and men in parliament incorporated into the draft constitution 
(Ngomuo, 2014; Rusimbi, 2014). And as the constitutional review continues, many women activists 
are looking beyond the 50/50 representation already in the draft constitution. Constituent Assembly 
member and coordinator of the Tanzania Women Cross-Party Platform Ave Maria Semakafu reminds 
that achieving gender parity will require going beyond parliament to include executive appointments 
and other decision making positions (Mulemwa, 2014). In mid-2014 the outcome of the constitutional 
review process was still not clear; the draft constitution is supposed to be put to a referendum by the 
end of the year. 
Time Limitations – Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe a constitutional review process eventually led to the adoption of an electoral gender 
quota for elections for parliament, though only for two elections, in 2013 and 2018. In Zimbabwe 
women had participated in the decades-long armed struggle that was necessary to attain black majority 
rule in 1980 - as combatants but also in more supportive roles as cooks and porters (Chadya, 2003). 
Some have suggested that this participation in the liberation struggle accounts for some of the initial 
gains women experienced at independence, for example the adoption of the Legal Age of Majority Act 
in 1982 that, for the first time, granted women majority status at the age of 18, “paving their way for 
their further political and economic empowerment” (Essof, 2009). Within a few short years, however, 
Essof (2009) asserts, “patriarchy reassert[ed] itself” and much of the political will to address gender 
inequality lapsed.  
Indeed, Jessie Majome, a woman MP and deputy minister of women affairs, gender and 
community development, described Zimbabwe before the recent constitutional reform process as 
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“having one of the worst constitutions in the world in terms of women’s rights” (Mervis and Nyemba, 
2013: 205). Zimbabwe’s 1980 constitution and electoral laws had made no provisions for advancing 
women’s participation in elected office. Thus since black majority rule in 1980 women had fared 
poorly in electoral politics. Until the new constitution was adopted in 2013, women had never gained 
more than about 15 percent of the seats in its National Assembly: 9 percent for the independence 
election in 1980 and 9 percent again in 1985, 15 percent in 1990 and 1995, down to 9 percent at the 
2000 election, and back up to 17 percent for the 2005 election and again 15 percent for the 2008 
election.
18
 Over the years some, though not all, political parties had made public statements 
announcing the adoption of internal party quotas but, with no strict regulations promoting the 
inclusion of women candidates and/or a practice of nominating women candidates to opposition 
strongholds rather than their own ‘safe seats,’ such efforts by political parties seemed halfhearted at 
best and produced few increases in women’s representation (Mervis and Nyemba, 2013: 206). Indeed, 
even in the 2013 election the three political parties were still fielding women candidates in 
constituencies where they were weakest and least likely to win seats (ERC, 2013: 11) (in strong 
contrast to the policy of political parties elsewhere of standing women candidates in their ‘safe seats’ 
so as to gain more women members). 
During the late 1990s an attempt to draft and adopt a new constitution had taken place and failed, 
in many respects a victim of escalating political violence and socioeconomic strife in the country 
(Ranchold Nilsson, 2008; Essof, 2009). Women’s organizations had been involved in that effort, 
organized eventually under the umbrella of a Women’s Coalition, a coalition of women’s 
organizations, and had ultimately decided to vote against the reform process, because of the many 
shortcomings of the draft constitution, including not guaranteeing women’s rights to equal social and 
economic standing (including heath care and education), not upholding a right not to experience 
violence, and not offering equal political representation or protection from discriminatory cultural 
practices (Essof, 2009). By the 2010s it was evident to many women activists that the ‘only solution’ 
for increasing women’s representation was a ‘constitutional quota’ (Mervis and Nyemba, 2013: 210): 
“in line with evidence from around the globe, it would appear prudent to create and enforce a quota 
system in Zimbabwe at the national constitutional level that guarantees women a level of 
representation” (Dube, 2013: 207). Indeed, at the 2013 election, the first with reserved seats and under 
the new constitution, women doubled their membership in the National Assembly winning 31.5 
percent of seats.  
Many organizations in Zimbabwe mobilized around the second constitutional reform process and 
the idea of adding electoral gender quotas to bring more women in to politics. In late 2006 the Women 
in Politics Support Unit (WIPSU) launched a 50/50 campaign which, however, had little impact on the 
2008 election. By early 2011 when the second constitutional reform process was underway WIPSU 
called for ‘some urgent fundamental shifts and changes’ if the situation of women in politics was to 
improve. Without specifying a particular mechanism, WIPSU called for a legislated or constitutional 
quota that would bring in a 50/50 parliament, whether through party quotas or reserved seats. Both 
Tanzania and Rwanda were cited as examples of effective quotas (IRIN, 2007; WIPSU, 2011). By the 
time of the referendum on the constitution, four years in the making, in March 2013, the Women’s 
Coalition was urging women to vote for the draft constitution. Slyvia Chirawu, a national coordinator 
for Women and Law in Southern Africa, and a member of the Women’s Coalition, argued that: 
“Definitely life for women will never be the same again under this new constitution, if it’s adopted.” 
In addition to providing quotas for parliament and other political offices, the constitution addresses 
such issues as levirate marriage, age of marriage for girls, inheritance and maintenance, among others 
(Mudimu, 2013).  
The new constitution of May 2013 and an amended Electoral Act of 2013 provide for 60 reserved 
seats for women in the National Assembly, with six selected from each of 10 provinces, in addition to 
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210 constituency based seats elected on a FPTP electoral system. The reserved seats are allocated to 
political parties according to the percentage of the vote cast for each party in the directly elected 
constituency seats in a given province (ERC, 2013: 12, UN Women, 4 September 2013). Zimbabwe’s 
Senate also has an electoral gender quota that employs a proportional representation system for 60 
elected seats out of 80; not only are all party lists supposed to alternate men’s and women’s names in 
zebra or zipper fashion, but women are required to top every list. Of the remaining 20 seats in the 
Senate, 18 are for traditional chiefs and two for persons with disabilities (ERC, 2013; Majome, 2013). 
In July 2013, elections were held in Zimbabwe to end a four year political transition that had been 
overseen by a government of national unity following the signing of a power sharing agreement by 
three political parties in 2008. Following the 2013 election, 31.5 percent of members of the National 
Assembly are women and 47.5 percent of members of the Senate are women 
(http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2383.htm). As has happened in some other African countries, 
however, there are reports that during the 2013 election women activists and candidates were told that 
for the National Assembly “they were already catered for through the reserved seats and should not 
concern themselves too much with the constituency seats” (ERC, 2013: 12). In the event, fewer 
women stood for the constituency based seats in 2013 than in 2008 and only 9.3 percent of those 
directly elected in the 2013 election were women as opposed to 15.2 percent in the 2008 election 
(ERC, 2013: 13).  
The potentially more damaging innovation in the Zimbabwe case is in putting a time limit on the 
electoral gender quotas – in that they are in place only for two elections, in 2013 and 2018. ‘Sunset 
clauses’ or explicit limits on the adoption of electoral gender quotas are unusual though not unheard 
of. Such a temporary quota exists in Uruguay for the 2014 election and one has been proposed for 
Chile for the next few elections. At the same time observers note that in Uruguay women activists are 
already mobilizing to make the quota permanent and in more than one instance such initially 
‘temporary’ quotas have simply been adopted later or the sunset clauses expired and not been 
renewed.
19
 The time limit in Zimbabwe is understood to be a compromise in order to adopt the quota 
at all and it is not at all clear at this time what will happen after 2018.  
Conclusion 
For decades now sub-Saharan Africa has led the world in women’s national legislative representation, 
at least in the sense of Rwanda topping the list since its 2003 election and having more women than 
men in its Chamber of Deputies since 2008. In addition, SSA has seen some of the most rapid 
transformations in the composition of legislatures in the world over the past couple of decades – and 
all because of the adoption of one kind of electoral gender quota or another. This article has discussed 
some of the more recent innovations in quota design and use in SSA, focusing on the adoption of a 
gender parity law in Senegal, the discussion of gender parity in Tanzania and the adoption of a 
temporary special measure in Zimbabwe – electoral gender quotas for two elections only.  
Like many of the other recently adopted electoral gender quotas in Africa - part of a ‘second wave’ 
- these have been or will be adopted as legislated or constitutional quotas, and not voluntary in any 
way, making them much stronger. In addition, gender parity is clearly a stronger commitment than a 
20 or 30 percent quota and reserved seats, with their guaranteed outcome, are stronger than any other 
type of electoral gender quota. In another way this second wave is different from the first wave in that 
these quotas have not been adopted or strengthened during a post-conflict or otherwise fully-fledged 
political transition, although there has certainly been a political opportunity or political opening, 
typically a constitutional reform or review process. Just as in the first wave, mobilized national 
women’s movements have played a significant role, typically working in collaboration with regional, 
continental and international organizations. Regional organizations like SADC and ECOWAS are 
                                                     
19
 Jennifer Piscopo, personal facebook communication, 29 May 2014. 
“A Lot of Headwraps”: Innovations in a Second Wave of Electoral Gender Quotas in sub-Saharan Africa 
11 
playing important roles, as is the African Union, a thoroughly 50/50 institution, as women’s 
organizations seek to hold governments accountable for their commitments to the organizations and 
their declarations and protocols. ‘Political will’ – likely reflecting political pressure from women’s 
movements and the accountability demanded by international declarations and protocols - has figured 
prominently in all three cases as well. It remains to be seen whether the last dozen or so sub-Saharan 
African countries will be swept up in the second wave.  
Table 1 Sub-Saharan Africa Women’s Representation and Electoral Gender Quotas in single or 
lower houses of parliament,* 2014 
Country 
Total 
Seats/Total 
Women 
Percent 
Women/Last 
Election 
Electoral 
System Year Quota Adopted Quota Type 
Angola 220/81 36.8/2012 List PR 
2005 electoral law, 
30% 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Botswana 63/6 9.5/2009 FPTP 1999, 30% Voluntary Pol. Party 
Benin 83/7 8.4/2011 List PR 
N/A, 20% quota 
adopted and nullified NONE 
Burkina Faso 127/24 18.9/2012 List PR 
electoral law, 30%; 
less public funding  
Legislated 
Candidate 
Burundi 105/32 30.5/2010 List PR 
2005 constitution and 
2009 electoral law, 
30% 
Legislated 
Candidate/ 
Co-optation 
Cameroon 180/56 31.1/2013 
PBV/List PR, 
FPTP 2012 electoral code 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Cape Verde 72/15 20.8/2011 List PR 2010 electoral law  
Legislated 
Candidate 
CAR 104/13 13.0/2011 TRS N/A NONE 
Chad 188/28 14.9/2011 
PBV/List PR, 
FPTP N/A NONE 
Comoros 33/1 3.0/2009 TRS N/A NONE 
Congo 136/10 7.4/2012 TRS 
2002 constitution, 
2007 electoral law, 
15% 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Congo 
Democratic 
Republic 492/44 8.9/2011 Parallel 
2011 constitution and 
electoral law (parity) 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Cote d'Ivoire 254/24 9.4/2011 FPTP/PBV 2001, 30% Voluntary Pol. Party 
Djibouti 55/7 12.7/2013 MMP 
2002 electoral law, 
10% Reserved Seats 
Equatorial 
Guinea 100/24 24.0/2013 List PR 
 
Voluntary Pol. Party 
Eritrea 150/33 22.0/1994 Transition 
1994 electoral law, 
30% Reserved Seats 
Ethiopia 547/152 27.8/2010 FPTP 30% Voluntary Pol. Party  
Gabon 120/18 15.0/2011 FPTP 
 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Gambia 53/5 9.4/2012 FPTP N/A NONE 
Ghana 275/30 10.9/2012 FPTP 
N/A though had 10% 
quota in 1960 and 
1965 NONE 
Guinea 114/25 21.9/2013 Parallel 
1993 electoral law, 
30%  
Legislated 
Candidate 
Guinea-Bissau 100/11 11.0/2008 List PR N/A NONE 
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Kenya 350/67 19.1/2013 FPTP 
2010 constitution, 
<15% 
Reserved Seats (47) 
By county 
Lesotho 120/32 26.7/2012 MMP 2011 electoral law 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Liberia 73/8 11.0/2011 FPTP N/A NONE 
Madagascar 147/34 23.1/2013 Parallel N/A NONE 
Malawi 193/43 22.3/2009 FPTP 2004, 25%-33% Voluntary Pol. Party 
Mali 147/14 9.5/2013 TRS 
30% proposed in 2005 
but not adopted Voluntary Pol. Party 
Mauritania 147/37 25.2/2013 Mixed 2010 electoral law 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Mauritius 69/13 18.8/2010 PBV N/A NONE 
Mozambique 250/98 39.2/2009 List PR 1994, 40%, Frelimo Voluntary Pol. Party 
Namibia 78/19 24.4/2009 List PR 2012, 50%, SWAPO Voluntary Pol. Party 
Niger 113/15 13.3/2011 List PR 
2001 electoral law, 
10% 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Nigeria 360/24 6.7/2011 FPTP N/A NONE 
Rwanda 80/51 64/2013 List PR 
2003 constitution, 
2010 electoral law, 
30% 
Reserved Seats (24) 
By province 
Sao Tome PR 55/10 18.2/2010 List PR N/A NONE 
Senegal 150/64 42.7/2012 Parallel 
2010 electoral law, 
50%, disqualification 
Legislated 
Candidate 
Seychelles 32/14 43.8/2011 Parallel N/A NONE 
Sierra Leone 121/15 12.4/2012 FPTP N/A NONE 
Somalia 275/38 13.8/2012 Appointed 
2011 constitution, 
30% Reserved Seats 
South Africa 400/163 40.8/2014 List PR 1994 Voluntary Pol. Party 
South Sudan 332/88 26.5/2011 Appointed 
2011 constitution, 
25%  Reserved Seats 
Sudan 354/86 24.3/2010 Parallel 
2008 constitution, 
25%  Reserved Seats (88) 
Swaziland 65/4 6.2/2013 TRS 
2005 constitution, 
30% Reserved Seats 
Tanzania 350/126 36.0/2010 FPTP 
2005 constitution and 
electoral law, 30% 
Reserved Seats 
Based on % party 
Togo 91/14 15.4/2013 List PR 
2012 electoral law, 
30% for next election  
Legislated 
Candidate 
Uganda 386/135 35.0/2011 FPTP 
2001 constitution and 
electoral law, 25% 
Reserved Seats 
By district 
Zambia 158/17 10.8/2011 FPTP N/A NONE 
Zimbabwe 270/85 31.5/2013 FPTP 
2013 constitution, 
20% for 2013 and 
2018 elections 
Reserved Seats (60) 
Based on % vote 
Data compiled from Inter-Parliamentary Union Women in National Parliaments: www.ipu.org/ and from Global Database of 
Quotas for Women: www.quotaproject.org/ and from country researches.  
List PR: each party presents a list of candidates; voters vote for a party and the parties receive seats in 
proportion to their overall share of the vote. FPTP: winning candidate is the one who gains more 
votes than any other even if not a majority; uses single member constituencies and voters vote for 
candidates, not parties. TRS (two-round system): plurality/majority voting system used to elect a 
single winner, whereby only two candidates from the first round continue to the second round. Block 
Vote: plurality/majority system used in multi-member districts, in which electors have as many votes 
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as there are candidates to be elected, and the candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. 
Parallel System: mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used to elect 
representatives through two different systems – one List PR and one plurality/majority – but where no 
account is taken of the seats allocated under the first system in calculating the results in the second 
system. MMP: mixed system in which the choices of voters are used to elect through two different 
systems and in which PR seats are awarded to compensate for any disproportionality in the results 
from the plurality majority system. 
*Most parliaments in SSA are unicameral.  
15/49 countries have no quotas  
12/15 countries with no quota are FPTP or some combination of plurality majority  
34/49 countries have quotas, though 8/34 may be considered 'meaningless' 
11/34 countries have reserved seats 
15/34 countries have voluntary party or legislated candidate quotas with PR system 
8/34 countries have voluntary party or legislated candidate quotas with FPTP so potentially 
'meaningless' 
26/49 or half of SSA countries have ‘effective’ quotas 
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